Eddington v. State Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 44353 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
2-7-2017
Eddington v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
44353
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Eddington v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 44353" (2017). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6484.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6484
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 

















Case No. CV PC 15 16861 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for 
Ada County 
Hon. Lynn Norton, District Judge 
ELLEN N. SMITH 
SMITH HORRAS, P.A. 
5561 N. GLENWOOD ST. 
BOISE, ID 83714 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
LAWRENCE WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
Fl 
FEB O 7 2017 
1 
I. TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ...•••••••••••••••••••••.•.•.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 4 
IT. ARGUMENT ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ,4 
III. CONCLUSION •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•.•••••••••••••••••••••..••••••••• 8 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 2 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 
61 P.3d 626,628 (Ct. App. 2002) 
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 
102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004) 
Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 
190 P .3d 920, 923 (Ct.App. 2008) 
Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,521,236 
P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010) 
DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 
200 P .3d 1148, 1152 (2009) 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 
669 (1984) 
Sparks v. State, 92 P.3d 542, 548, 140 
Idaho 292,298 (Idaho App. 2004) 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 
(1980) 
Chippewa v. State, 156 Idaho 915,921, 
332 P.3d 827, 833 (2014) 
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 
(2002) 
Daniels v. United States, 54 F.3d 290, 
295 (7th Cir.1995) 
Holloway v.Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475,488, 
98 S.Ct. 1173, 1179, 55 L.Ed.2d 426, 
437 (1978) 















Respondent summarily argues that the District Court correctly dismissed all of Mr. 
Eddington's claims summarily and without a hearing. However, Respondent provided very little 
analysis or argument to support its position. As thoroughly discussed in Mr. Eddington's 
opening brief, Mr. Eddington set forth eight (8) different ways, collectively and/or individually, 
that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel. Nevertheless, Respondent selected only 
two (2) relatively small issues out of Mr. Eddington's eight (8) specific and well documented 
reasons that his trial counsel was ineffective. The two (2) problematic issues singled out by 
Respondent are only a small fraction of the collective errors resulting the deprivation of Mr. 
Eddington receiving his constitutionally guaranteed effective assistance of counsel. Other than 
the conclusory assertion that the District Court "correctly" dismissed Mr. Eddington's claims, 
Respondent fails to address the majority of Mr. Eddington's concerns set forth in his opening 
brief. 
Moreover, even though Respondent requested two (2) separate extensions delaying this 
matter approximately sixty (60) days while Mr. Eddington remains incarcerated, Respondent's 
substantive briefing turned out to be only eleven (11) pages (not including signature page and 
attached exhibit). 
II. ARGUMENT 
As stated previously, if the petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the petition 
allege facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim may not 
be summarily dismissed. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); 
Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 923 (Ct.App. 2008). Consequently, if a 
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genuine issue of material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve 
the factual issues. Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 P.3d at 629. 
Just as in civil summary judgment motions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56, all inferences must be 
liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. Claims may only be summarily 
dismissed if the petitioner's allegations are clearly disproven by the record of the criminal 
proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each 
essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner's allegations do not justify relief as a matter of 
law. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); DeRushe v. State, 146 
Idaho 599,603,200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009). 
Respondent Completely Ignored the Fact that Mr. Eddington was Deprived Effective 
Assistance of Counsel Because His Trial Counsel Was Operating Under an Actual Conflict of 
Interest. Notably, Respondent failed to discuss Mr. Eddington's extensive briefing, reasoning 
and analyis regarding the glaring conflict of interest of Mr. Eddington's trial counsel (roughly 35 
pages of the 50 page brief). In fact, the words "conflict of interest" do not even appear anywhere 
in the Respondent's brief (other than in the District Court's decision attached as an exhibit). It is 
unclear as to why Respondent refused to discuss the central issues in this case. What is clear, 
however, is that it is essential that this Court not take Respondent's lead and simply ignore the 
fact Mr. Eddington was denied his Sixth Amendment right to conflict free and effective 
assistance of counsel. Mr. Eddington's recitation of the facts, his application of the law and his 
extensive analysis deserve a full and fair review. 
Interestingly, by ignoring the obvious actual conflict of interest in the underlying criminal 
case, Respondent was able to pretend a higher standard applied in this matter. Nevertheless, 
pursuant to Idaho law, if a defendant shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting 
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interests, there is a high probability of prejudice arising from multiple concurrent representation. 
Sparks v. State, 92 P.3d 542, 548, 140 Idaho 292, 298 (Idaho App. 2004). In a nutshell, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals has held that the second prong of the Strickland test demonstrating 
prejudice is presumed in such conflict of interest cases. Id. Instead, in order to establish a 
violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a defendant must 
demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. See 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980). 
To demonstrate an "actual conflict," a defendant must first show that his counsel actively 
represented conflicting interests and second, that the conflict adversely affected his counsel's 
performance. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350; Chippewa v. State, 156 Idaho 915,921,332 P.3d 827,833 
(2014). See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 (2002) (Actual conflict is defined by its effect 
on counsel, not by whether there is a "mere theoretical division of loyalties"). Please see 
Appellant's Opening Brief pps. 14-21 for detailed analysis of Mr. Bartlett's actual conflict of 
interest. 
To establish an adverse effect, the petition must: (1) identify a plausible alternative 
defense strategy or tactic; (2) show that the alternative strategy or tactic was objectively 
reasonable; and (3) show that defense counsel's failure to pursue that strategy or tactic was linked 
to the actual conflict. Chippewa, 156 Idaho at 919-22, 332 P.3d at 831-34. Although not binding 
authority, it is certainly instructive that in the ih Circuit, "a defendant can establish ineffective 
assistance of counsel by showing that his attorney pressured him to plead guilty because of the 
attorney's conflict of interest." Daniels v. United States. 54 F.3d 290,295 (7th Cir.1995). 
Notably, the United States Supreme Court has stated: 
[I]n a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil-it 
bears repeating-is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to 
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refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial 
plea negotiations and in the sentencing process. It may be possible 
in some cases to indentify from the record the prejudice resulting 
from an attorney's failure to undertake certain trial tasks, but even 
with a record of the sentencing hearing available it would be 
difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the 
attorney's representation of a client. And to assess the impact of a 
conflict of interests on the attorney's options, tactics, and decisions 
in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible!' HollowBy v. 
Arkansas, supra, 435 U.S., at 490 -491. 
For the same reasons as cited above, it would typically be futile to attempt to determine 
precisely how counsel's conduct would have been different had he not been under conflicting 
duties. For that reason, a petitioner need only demonstrate that a conflict of interest actually 
affected the adequacy of his lawyer's performance. Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho at 296. 
It is undisputed that Mr. Bartlett, Mr. Eddington's trial counsel, represented Mr. 
Eddington and Diana Eddington ("Diana") (Mr. Eddington's mother) at the same time on related 
felony criminal cases. It is undisputed that Mr. Bartlett never discussed the conflict of interest 
with either Mr. Eddington nor Diana. It is undisputed that Mr. Bartlett never had anyone sign a 
waiver of the conflict of interest. It is undisputed that Mr. Bartlett refused to permit Diana to 
testify on her son's behalf due to the conflict of interest. R. 15-19; R. 224-228. It is undisputed 
that Mr. Bartlett refused to permit Diana to write a a letter in support of her son due to the 
conflict of interest. R. 16; R. 137; R. 225-226. It is undisputed that Diana's felony charge would 
not be dismissed until AFTER Mr. Eddington plead guilty. R. 14-19; R. 222-228; R. 136. It is 
undisputed that Mr. Bartlett forcefully insisted that Mr. Eddington take a plea agreement he was 
not comfortable with so that Diana's felony charge would be dismissed. R. 24-27. 
However, Mr. Bartlett's prioritizing of Diana's claim over Mr. Eddington's best interests 
did not stop there. Rather, Mr. Bartlett's divided loyalties and conflict of interest even interfered 
with his putting forth a defense for Mr. Eddington at his sentencing in an effort to avoid 
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jeopardizing the dismissal of Diana's case. R. 25-27. During the course of the sentencing 
hearing, Mr. Bartlett objected a total of seven (7) times. Of those objections, four ( 4) applied 
directly to the prosecution's mention of Diana Eddington's case. R. 32-44. 
As thoroughly discussed in Appellant's Opening Brief, summary dismissal is 
permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, 
if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the relief requested. If such a 
factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing !!ill!! be conducted. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 
517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); DeRushev. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 
1152 (2009) (emphasis added). Id. 
Clearly, as evidenced by the undisputed facts, Mr. Bartlett's actual conflict in 
representing both Mr. Eddington and Diana affected the adequacy of Mr. Bartlett's 
representation of Mr. Eddington. If the District Court did not want to out right reverse the 
conviction/sentence based on this uncontroverted evidence, at the very least Mr. Eddington 
deserved an evidentiary hearing on these issues pursuant to Idaho law. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Eddington provided more than enough unrebutted and admissible evidence in 
support of his claims. Mr. Eddington should be granted summary disposition of his PCRM in his 
favor. In the alternative, the case should be remanded so that Mr. Eddington can have the 
evidentiary hearing that he is entitled to pursuant to the law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this f ~y of February, 2017. 
SMITH HORRAS P.A. 
~Y-J 
Ellen N. Smith, of the Firm 
Attorneys for Appellant, Ronald Eddington 
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